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Abstract
What instruments of monetary policy must be used in order to imple-
ment a unique equilibrium? This paper revisits the issues addressed by
Sargent and Wallace (1975) on the multiplicity of equilibria when policy is
conducted with interest rate rules. We show that the appropriate interest
rate instruments under uncertainty are state-contingent interest rates, i.e.
the nominal returns on state-contingent nominal assets. A policy that pegs
state-contingent nominal interest rates, and sets the initial money supply,
implements a unique equilibrium. These results hold whether prices are
￿ exible or set in advance.
Key words: Monetary policy; policy instruments; sticky prices; state-
contingent interest rates.
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This paper revisits the issues addressed by Sargent and Wallace (1975), among
many others, on the multiplicity of equilibria when policy is conducted with in-
terest rate rules. We show that while policy on state-noncontingent interest rates
is unable to pin down a unique equilibrium, that is not the case when the pol-
icy instruments are the returns on state-contingent nominal assets. If monetary
policy targets state-contingent interest rates, as well as the initial money supply,
in ￿ exible price models and in a class of sticky price models, there is a unique
equilibrium.
In a deterministic ￿ exible price model if policy sets exogenously the path of
nominal interest rates as well as the initial money supply there is a unique perfect
foresight equilibrium. Under uncertainty, setting the initial money supply and the
nominal interest rate in every state of the world is not su¢ cient to pin down a
unique equilibrium. The path of the nominal interest rate in a ￿ exible price model
pins down the allocations and the average growth rate of the price level, but not
the distribution of prices across states. In order to pin down a unique equilibrium,
there have to be additional exogenous instruments of policy.
Under sticky prices setting the path for the nominal interest rates not only
does not pin down the distribution of prices it also generates multiple equilibria
in the allocations. Adao, Correia and Teles (2003), use a model with prices set
one period in advance and show that when the nominal interest rate is given,
possibly arbitrarily close to the optimal rule which is the Friedman rule of zero
nominal interest rates, there is a large set of implementable allocations. In that
paper the optimal allocation is implemented by setting exogenously not only the
nominal interest rates but also the money supplies in some, but not all, states of
the world. Setting the returns on the state-contingent nominal interest rates is an
alternative, natural, way to implement that optimal allocation.
There is a vast literature on using interest rate feedback rules to address the
issue of multiplicity of equilibria, as in McCallum (1981). This analysis is about
local determinacy, not about uniqueness. Appropriately chosen interest rate feed-
back rules can implement a locally determinate equilibrium, i.e. a single equilib-
rium in the neighborhood of a steady state. In the deterministic model this means
that there is only one initial price level and corresponding money supply that is
associated with a path converging to the steady state. In the approximately lin-
ear system the other equilibrium paths are divergent. Not necessarily so in the
non-linear system, as shown by the examples in Benhabib, Schmitt￿ Grohe and
2Uribe (2001) and Christiano and Rostagno (2002).
We assume throughout the paper that ￿scal policy is determined endogenously,
in line with an extensive literature on multiplicity of equilibria in monetary models.
In contrast, exogenous ￿scal policy could be used, as in the ￿scal theory of the
price level, to determine a unique equilibrium.
This paper is closely related to Adao, Correia and Teles (2004b), as well as
Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2003) and Bloise, Dreze and Polemarchakis (2004).
Those papers, in contrast with this one, analyze the degrees of freedom in con-
ducting monetary policy when the instruments are the money supply and the
nominal interest rate. Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2003) impose restrictions on
the structure of the economy and on the policies so that the policy results are
the same whether the economy has a ￿nite or an in￿nite horizon. Instead, Adao,
Correia and Teles (2004) show that the policy results in the economy with an
in￿nite horizon can be very di⁄erent from the ones in the analogous ￿nite horizon
economy.
Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004) have shown that state-contingent
debt may be replicated by debt of multiple maturities. A possible implication for
the result in this paper is that pegging the prices of the state-contingent nominal
assets could be achieved by pegging the prices of debt of di⁄erent maturities.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we consider a simple cash in
advance economy with ￿ exible prices. In that economy a policy that sets ex-
ogenously the nominal interest rates and the initial money supply implements a
unique equilibrium in the deterministic case, but not under uncertainty. We show
that a policy that implements a unique equilibrium under uncertainty sets exoge-
nously the state-contingent interest rates, as well as the initial money supply. We
show that the set of equilibria can be implemented with zero net supply of nom-
inal state-contingent assets. In Section 3, we show that the results are extended
to economies with prices set in advance. We also show that they are not robust
to all price setting restrictions. Section 4 contains concluding remarks.
2. A model with ￿ exible prices
We ￿rst consider a simple cash in advance economy with ￿ exible prices. The
economy consists of a representative household, a representative ￿rm behaving
competitively, and a government. The uncertainty in period t ￿ 0 is described
by the random variable st 2 St and the history of its realizations up to period t
(state or node at t), (s0;s1;:::;st), is denoted by st 2 St. We assume that st has
3a discrete distribution. The number of states in period t ￿ 0 is ￿t.
Production uses labor according to a linear technology. We impose a cash-
in-advance constraint on the households￿transactions with the timing structure
described in Lucas and Stokey (1983). That is, each period is divided into two
subperiods, with the assets market operational in the ￿rst subperiod and the goods
market in the second.
2.1. Competitive equilibria
Households The households have preferences over consumption Ct, and leisure









where ￿ is a discount factor. The households start period t with nominal wealth
Wt: They decide to hold money, Mt, and to buy Bt nominal bonds that pay RtBt
one period later. Rt is the gross nominal interest rate at date t. They also buy
Bt;t+1 units of state-contingent nominal securities. Each security pays one unit of
money at the beginning of period t + 1 in a particular state. Let Qt;t+1 be the
beginning of period t price of these securities normalized by the probability of the
occurrence of the state. The households spend EtQt;t+1Bt;t+1 in state-contingent
nominal securities. Thus, in the assets market at the beginning of period t they
face the constraint
Mt + Bt + EtQt;t+1Bt;t+1 ￿ Wt (2.2)
where the initial nominal wealth W0 is given.
Consumption must be purchased with money according to the cash in advance
constraint
PtCt ￿ Mt: (2.3)
At the end of the period, the households receive the labor income WtNt; where
Nt = 1 ￿ Lt is labor and Wt is the nominal wage rate and pay lump sum taxes,
Tt. Thus, the nominal wealth households bring to period t + 1 is
Wt+1 = Mt + RtBt + Bt;t+1 ￿ PtCt + WtNt ￿ Tt (2.4)
4The households￿problem is to maximize expected utility (2.1) subject to the
restrictions (2.2), (2.4), (2.3), together with a no-Ponzi games condition on the
holdings of assets.






















, t ￿ 0 (2.7)





Condition (2.5) sets the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and consumption equal to the real wage adjusted for the cost of using
money, Rt. Condition (2.6) is an intertemporal marginal condition necessary for
the optimal choice of risk-free nominal bonds. Condition (2.7) determines the
price of one unit of money at time t+1, for each state of nature st+1, normalized
by the conditional probability of occurrence of state st+1, in units of money at
time t.
Firms The ￿rms are competitive and prices are ￿ exible. The production func-
tion of the representative ￿rm is linear
Yt = AtNt




5Government The policy variables are taxes Tt, nominal interest rates Rt, state-
contingent nominal prices Qt;t+1, money supplies Mt, state-noncontingent public
debt Bt and state-contingent debt Bt;t+1. The government expenditures, Gt, are
exogenous.
The government budget constraints are
Mt + Bt + EtQt;t+1Zt+1 = Mt￿1 + Rt￿1Bt￿1 + Bt￿1;t + Pt￿1Gt￿1 ￿ Pt￿1Tt￿1, t ￿ 0
together with a no-Ponzi games condition. Let Qt+1 ￿ Q0;t+1, with Q0 = 1. If





Qt+1Mt (Rt ￿ 1) = W0 + E0
1 X
s=0
Qt+1Pt [Gt ￿ Tt] (2.10)
Market clearing
Ct + Gt = AtNt:
1 ￿ Lt = Nt:
We have already imposed market clearing in the money and asset markets.
Equilibria A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of policy variables, quan-
tities and prices such that the private agents solve their problems given the se-
quences of policy variables and prices, and the budget constraint of the government
is satis￿ed.
The competitive equilibriumconditions for the variables fCt;Ltg, fRt;Qt;t+1;Mt;Bt;Bt;t+1;Ttg
are the resource constraints








that are obtained from the households intratemporal conditions (2.12) and the
￿rms optimal condition (2.9), as well as the cash in advance constraints (2.3), the
intertemporal conditions (2.6) and (2.7), and the budget constraint (2.10).
6The equations identi￿ed above determine a set of equilibrium allocations,
prices and policy variables. In order for a particular equilibrium in this set to
be implemented need to determine exogenous policy rules for a subset of the pol-
icy variables. A policy rule for a particular policy variable can be a function of
only the state or of other variables. We will primarily consider the case where
policy rules are only functions of the state. An exogenous policy rule is one that
is not implied by the other equilibrium conditions.
In the next section we will show that if rates are set exogenously in every
date and state, as well as the initial money supply, there is a single perfect fore-
sight equilibrium, but multiplicity under uncertainty. The appropriate policy
instruments, that allow to implement a unique equilibrium, are the returns on
state-contingent nominal assets.
2.2. Multiplicity of equilibria with interest rate rules
In this section, we show that when policy is conducted with constant functions
for the monetary policy instruments, and ￿scal policy is endogenous, if policy
sets the nominal interest rates and the initial money supply, it is unable, under
uncertainty, to implement a unique equilibrium.
Without imposing restrictions on the policy variables, the equilibrium condi-
tions are the resources constraint, (2.11), the intratemporal condition (2.12), the
cash in advance constraints (2.3), the intertemporal conditions (2.6) and (2.7), as
well as the budget constraints (2.10). These conditions de￿ne a set of equilibrium
allocations, prices and policy variables. The set of allocations is the set of im-
plementable allocations. In order for the set of equilibrium conditions to have a
unique solution a subset of the policy variables must be set exogenously. We will
call this set, the set of instruments of policy.
We will start by showing that if the policy instruments are the nominal interest
rate, as well as the initial money supply, it is possible to implement a unique
equilibrium in the deterministic economy, but not under uncertainty. We ￿rst
consider the case in which the policy are sequences of constant functions for the
interest rates. The other policy variables are not exogenous. From the resources
constraints, (2.11), the intratemporal conditions (2.12), and the cash in advance
conditions, (2.3), we obtain the functions C(Rt) and N(Rt) and Pt = Mt
C(Rt), t ￿











, t ￿ 0 (2.13)
together with the budget constraints, (2.10).
Suppose the nominal interest rate is set exogenously in every date and state.
The allocation is pinned down uniquely. The issue is how can a unique sequence
of prices be pinned down. The proposition follows:
Proposition 2.1. Suppose policy are sequences of numbers for the nominal in-
terest rates. Let the interest rate be determined exogenously in every date and
state, as well as the initial money supply. For this policy the allocation and prices
are determined uniquely in the deterministic case. Under uncertainty, there is a
single solution for the consumption and labor allocations, but not for the price
levels.
Proof: Given the interest rate for every date and state, the allocation is ob-
tained from the functions C(Rt) and N(Rt).
At any period t ￿ 1, given Mt￿1, there are ￿t￿1 equations to determine ￿t
variables, Mt. More speci￿cally, for each state st￿1, there is one equation to
determine #St variables. Except for the deterministic case, there are multiple
solutions for the money supply, and consequently for the price level, Pt = Mt
C(Rt).￿
A policy that delivers a unique equilibrium sets the interest rate in every date
and state and the money supply in every state at some period T and thereafter
in ￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 states, for t ￿ 1. If we take a sequence of economies indexed by
T and make T arbitrarily large, those economies will have a single equilibrium,
and therefore the limit of these economies will also have a single equilibrium.
The economy for T = 1 is one where only interest rates are given exogenously,
and where therefore there are multiple equilibria. There is a discontinuity. This
exercise suggests the intuition that under uncertainty in order to pin down a
unique sequence for the price level it is necessary to pin down one money supply
for each history, in every terminal node. In the particular case of the deterministic
economy, money supply must be pinned down in any one period t ￿ 0.
The initial price indeterminacy in the deterministic economy under an interest
rate peg, is replaced by a terminal price indeterminacy, in every terminal state,
under uncertainty. As we will see below this explosion in degrees of indeterminacy
under uncertainty results from pegging the state-noncontingent nominal interest
8rates instead of the state-contingent nominal returns. If these were pegged instead,
there would be a single degree of indeterminacy as in the deterministic case. A
single equilibrium could be implemented by setting exogenously the money supply
in the initial period.
2.2.1. Feedback rules
We have assumed that policy were sequences of numbers for the policy variables.
However it is commonly assumed that policy is conducted with feedback rules,
in particular, interest rate feedback rules. These interest rate rules have been
proposed in the literature starting with McCallum (1981), as a means to guarantee
local determinacy. In Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) show that in monetary models
with transaction technologies depending on assumptions on timing there is local
determinacy when policy is conducted with interest rate feedback rules where the
nominal interest rate depends on either contemporaneous or past in￿ ation. It is
straightforward to see that the use of interest rate rules that depend on current or
past variables clearly preserves the same degrees of freedom in the determination
of policy. When ￿scal policy is endogenous, there are still multiple equilibria when
money supply is not used as an additional instrument.
2.3. Policy with state-contingent interest rates
In this section we show that a policy that pegs the state-contingent nominal
returns, as well as the money supply in the initial period, implements a unique
equilibrium.
The equilibrium conditions are the resources constraint, (2.11), the intratem-
poral condition (2.12), the cash in advance constraints (2.3), the intertemporal
conditions (2.6) and (2.7), as well as the budget constraints (2.10).
As before, from the resources constraints (2.11) and the intratemporal condi-
tion (2.12) we obtain the functions C(Rt) and N(Rt).







, t ￿ 0 (2.14)
together with (2.8), the cash in advance condition, (2.3), and the budget constraint
that determines, not uniquely, the endogenous taxes and debt levels, (2.10).
9Clearly if policy is conducted by setting exogenously the state-contingent nom-
inal interest rates, given the initial price level, the price levels are all determined.
In order to have a single equilibrium it would still be necessary to set exogenously
the initial money supply. The proposition follows:
Proposition 2.2. If the state-contingent interest rates are set exogenously for
every date and state, there is a unique equilibrium for the allocations and prices
if the money supply is set exogenously in the initial period.
Proof:
Let P0 be given. Given the values for fQt￿1;t,t ￿ 1g, fRt,t ￿ 0g are determined






, t ￿ 1 (2.15)
The condition above only holds for t ￿ 1. Cannot use the condition at t = 0,
to determine P0. M0 pins down the initial price.￿
In these economies there is a unique equilibrium if the policy is to peg the
nominal returns on the state-contingent nominal assets and in addition money
supply is set exogenously in the initial period. A timeless perspective (see Wood-
ford, 2003) abstracts from this initial period by concentrating on the asymptotic
behavior of the economy, as if the initial period had happened at an arbitrarily
early date.1 According to the timeless perspective all the government is required
to do is to set exogenously the state-contingent interest rates.
2.3.1. State-contingent debt in zero net supply
Even if the government stands ready to supply and demand any quantity of state-
contingent bonds at given state-contingent prices, these assets can be in zero net
supply in every equilibrium. To see this notice that, when the supply of state-
contingent assets is zero, Bt￿1;t = 0, the budget constraints of the government
are





Pt+1 for t = ￿1, instead of only from t = 0 on, as well as the assumption
that P￿1 is exogenous. These are additional conditions that allow to determine the price levels
at t = 0.
101 X
s=0
EtQt;t+s+1Mt+s (Rt+s ￿ 1) = Wt +
1 X
s=0
EtQt;t+s+1Pt+s [Gt+s ￿ Tt+s], t ￿ 0
(2.16)
where Wt = Mt￿1 + Rt￿1Bt￿1 + Pt￿1Gt￿1 ￿ Pt￿1Tt￿1. This must be satis￿ed
for any allocation and prices, at any period and state. Even with Bt￿1;t = 0,
there are still multiple solutions of these equations for the endogenous nominal
state-noncontingent debt and the lump sum taxes.
3. Price setting restrictions
In this section we show that the results derived above extend to an environment
with prices set in advance. We modify the environment to consider price setting
restrictions. There is a continuum of goods, indexed by i 2 [0;1]: Each good i
is produced by a di⁄erent ￿rm. The ￿rms are monopolistic competitive and set
prices in advance with di⁄erent lags.


























The households￿intertemporal and intratemporal conditions are as before, (2.5),
(2.6) and (2.7).












;￿ > 0 (3.2)
11Given the prices on each good i in units of money, Pt(i), the government minimizes

















di = AtNt: (3.4)
A fraction ￿j ￿rms set prices j periods in advance with j = 0;:::; J ￿1: Firms
decide the price for period t with the information up to period t￿j to maximize:
Et￿j [Qt￿j;t+1 (pt(i)yt(i) ￿ Wtnt(i))]
subject to the production function
yt(i) ￿ Atnt(i)







where yt(i) = ct(i) + gt(i)
The optimal price is





























Compared with the equilibrium conditions under ￿ exible prices, the set of
equilibrium conditions when prices are set in advance includes more variables,
12the prices of the di⁄erent ￿rms, but it also includes more restrictions, the price
setting restrictions. The number of additional variables and restrictions is the
same, and the degrees of freedom are the same as under ￿ exible prices. This
argument works in this case, because we can write the new equations as functions
of current and past variables. The degree of indeterminacy is the same as under
￿ exible prices and therefore the statement in Proposition 2.3, that a peg of state-
contingent interest rates delivers a unique equilibrium, still holds when prices are
set in advance.
We can replace the nominal wage from the intratemporal condition (2.5) in
the price setting restrictions (3.6). The equilibrium conditions can then be sum-



















where ￿t;j = (Qt￿j;t+1P￿
t )Yt
Et￿j[(Qt￿j;t+1P￿










= At (1 ￿ Lt):
The proposition follows:
Proposition 3.1. (Prices are set in advance) If the state-contingent interest rates
are set exogenously for every date and state, and the money supply is set exoge-
nously in the initial period, there is a unique equilibrium for the allocations and
prices.
Proof: Let fQt;t+1, t ￿ 0g be set exogenously. Then fRt, t ￿ 0g are deter-
mined uniquely.
At any t ￿ J, given Pt￿1, Ct￿1 and Lt￿1 there are ￿t intertemporal conditions,
￿t resource constraints, ￿t price level conditions, ￿t￿j price setting conditions,
j = 0;:::;J ￿ 1. The variables are ￿t consumptions Ct, ￿t levels of leisure Lt, ￿t
price levels and ￿t￿j prices for the di⁄erent ￿rms, j = 0;:::;J ￿ 1.
For t = 0, there are ￿0 price level conditions, ￿0 resources constraints, ￿0 price
setting conditions. The variables are ￿0 consumptions C0, ￿0 levels of leisure L0,
13￿0 price levels and ￿0 prices for the ￿ exible ￿rms in period 0. The other prices
are historical. Can use the cash in advance constraint with exogenous M0 to
determine all the variables in period 0.
For t = 1, given P0, C0 and L0, there are ￿1 price level conditions, ￿1 re-
sources constraints, ￿1 +￿0 price setting conditions, ￿0 intertemporal conditions
to determine the same number of variables. The variables are ￿1 consumptions
C1, ￿1 levels of leisure L1, ￿1 price levels, ￿1 prices for the ￿ exible ￿rms in period
1 and ￿0 prices for the ￿rms setting the price in period 0 for period 1. Similarly
for any period 1 ￿ t ￿ J ￿ 1.￿
The result in this proposition also applies to other forms of price setting, but
not to all. If prices were set in a staggered fashion so that the prices for period t
are functions of future variables, the proof does not go through, as we show next.
Staggered prices In this section we show that the results obtained so far
do not generalize to all forms of price setting, in particular we give an example
with prices set as in Taylor (1983) where the policy in Proposition 2.3 of setting
exogenously both state-contingent interest rates and the initial money supply
does not guarantee uniqueness. However, this is also an economy where, for the
deterministic case, setting the initial money supply and the nominal interest rate
in every date does not implement a unique equilibrium. This is the example we
provide.
A constant share of ￿rms, 1











where pt￿j is the price chosen by the type of ￿rm that can change the price at





























We consider for simplicity preferences that are separable and linear in leisure.
2See the Appendix for the derivation of the price setting condition.
14Proposition 3.2. Let preferences be separable and linear in leisure and ￿rms be
restricted to set prices as in Taylor (1983), for two periods, i.e. J = 2. Let the
state-contingent interest rates and the initial money supply be set. Then there
are multiple equilibria in this economy.
Proof: Replacing the cash in advance in the pricing equation for the ￿rm that
























, t ￿ 0 (3.8)











1￿￿ , t ￿ 0 (3.9)














, t ￿ 0 (3.10)
For t = 0, there are ￿0 equations (3.8), ￿0 equations (3.9) and ￿1 equations
(3.10) to determine (￿0) p0, (￿0) P0, (￿1) M1, (￿1) P1. There are ￿1 degrees of
indeterminacy, say, the prices in period 1 are not determined. For t = 1, we add
￿1 equations (3.8), ￿1 equations (3.9) and ￿2 equations (3.10) to determine (￿1)
p1, (￿1) P1, (￿2) M2, (￿2) P2. There are now ￿2 degrees of indeterminacy. The
price levels in period 2 are not determined. Similarly for period 3, and any period
thereafter. The equilibrium conditions do not have a single solution.￿
4. Concluding Remarks
We have shown that a monetary policy that targets the state-contingent nominal
returns, as opposed to the state-noncontingent nominal interest rates, is able
to eliminate the indeterminacy associated with uncertainty. In economies with
￿ exible prices and prices set in advance, that policy, for a given initial money
supply, implements a unique equilibrium.
While in a ￿nite horizon economy the argument that price setting restrictions
add the same number of restrictions as unknowns is valid, that is not the case in the
15in￿nite horizon economy. As shown in this paper in a staggered price environment,
as in Taylor (1983), the policy analyzed in this paper does not deliver a unique
equilibrium. However that is also an economy where, in the deterministic version,
a policy that sets the nominal interest rate in every date, as well as the initial
money supply, is not su¢ cient to determine a unique equilibrium.
A policy that pegs the returns on state-contingent nominal assets may seem
a di¢ cult task for the monetary authority, even if less so when reminded of the
result of Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004) that state-contingent
government debt can be replicated by debt of multiple maturities. However, it is
also one that has the advantage of solving the multiplicity of equilibria generated
by an interest rate rule. Furthermore, it is also a policy that can be used to
implement a unique equilibrium at the, consistently optimal, Friedman rule of
zero nominal interest rates
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174.1. Appendix: Taylor (1983) price setting
A constant share of ￿rms, 1
















The pro￿ts ￿t+j should be discounted with
Uc(t+1+j)
Pt+1+j since they can only be used
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